Countries try to attract -and tax-mobile resources such as foreign direct investment ‡ows or human capital. Their activities include informative or persuasive advertising, branding, and educational policies that generate home attachment. This competition closely resembles the competition for a common pool resource. Further, Bertrand competition in tax rates interacts with this type of competition. I provide some piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I also endogenize the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens or investors and consider the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and minimum taxes can intensify the common pool problem.
Introduction
Public …nance has analyzed competition for direct investment, …nancial capital and human capital 1 with a focus on tax rates as the instrument of competition. There are notable exceptions, but the general validity of the claim becomes evident if one recalls the Wildasin (1988) or the Zodrow-Mieskowski (1986) frameworks of tax competition that have become the workhorses for analysing tax competition. 2 In this respect, much of this analysis is structurally similar to what would be considered as Bertrand or price competition in the context of the competition between …rms. Other types of 'price'competition for capital have also been explored: standard auctions ( Countries can use other means of competition by which they can try and acquire a larger share of the tax base, and some of these competition modes make the tax base a common pool resource. 3 I de…ne a common pool resource here as a resource that is rival in its use, for which property rights are not (yet) well de…ned, with players rivalling regarding the allocation of property rights. Tax rates or investment subsidies are clearly important determinants as variables that govern the allocation of the internationally mobile tax base. But the extent to which a country can impose taxes on a given tax base without making it move away is governed by activities which are structurally similar to appropriation e¤ort or e¤ort in establishing property claims. Major 1 Foreign direct investment and …nancial capital are the more prominent targets in tax competition. However, competition for human capital has a long tradition. Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973) , Bhagwati (1976) and Raymond (1973) were among the …rst to discuss the downsides of this competition. 2 Any list of seminal contributions to this capital tax competition literature will notoriously be unfair to some authors, but should include Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) , Wilson (1986) , Wildasin (1988) , Gordon (1986 Gordon ( , 1992 and Sinn (1990) . I gladly leave a possible blame of omissions to the excellent surveys by Wilson (1999) , Wildasin and Wilson (2004) , Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005) and Sørensen (2007) . 3 Tax base as a common pool resource has been considered in the context of vertical tax externalities, where a tax base in one location is subject to taxation by multiple, vertically ordered and independently acting …scal authorities, as in Keen (1998) , Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Wrede (1997 Wrede ( , 2000 . Wrede (1999) explicitly uses the term "…scal common" in this context. categories of such appropriation e¤orts are advertising, branding, and the investment in tax payer loyalty.
Countries widely advertise, trying to attract foreign direct investors. This advertising is partially informative. Informative advertising was used in Austria's campaign in 2005. The full-page advertisement simply displayed a comparison between the corporate tax rates of 25 percent in Austria and 38 percent in Germany. The advertisement also emphasized that Austria and Germany are very similar along other dimensions that are relevant determinants for investment decisions, including access to the German market. 4 This type of advertisement weakens the loyalty of citizens or investors in other countries, by informing them about other alternatives. Other types of advertising may aim at building up a particular image, making the country di¤erent from other countries in the eyes of the investors or tax payers. An example for this type of advertising is a recent campaign 5 by the International Marketing Council (IMC) of South Africa by which a public-private partnership tries to give the country the image described on their homepage: "South Africa, a country at the southern tip of Africa, inspires the world to a new way of doing things, because our unique combinations create refreshing possibilities".
Finally, Germany launched a major advertising campaign for attracting foreign direct investment in 2006, labelled Germany, Land of Ideas. As part of this campaign, German fashion top model Claudia Schi¤er volunteered to pose. Pictures of her have been displayed prominently on advertising boards in the subway stations of London and New York. On these pictures she is partially wrapped in a German ‡ag and the headline says: "Invest in Germany, boys". The idea that "persuasive" advertising is a common pool problem where …rms expend e¤ort for attracting a larger share in a given pool of customers is very old. It is the basic underlying hypothesis for much of the formal game theory on advertising in the business literature and can be traced back at least to Friedman (1958) or Schmalensee (1976) . Countries play these games as well. 7 Much like …rms, countries also invest in their brand names. The Anholt Nation Brands Index, for instance, publicizes the brand values of 30 major nations on a quarterly basis. According to this index, in 2006 the brand value of the United States of America was more than 17 trillion US-Dollar. The value of Germany as a brand was lower, but still 100 times the market value of Coca-Cola. The factors that in ‡uence the brand value are partially known. A nation's relative success along many dimensions, including economics, science or sports matters. Also, public attention gained from hosting major events such as the Olympics or the World Soccer Championships matter. Expenditure by which politicians try to persuade the members of the IOC, or expenditure that promote national sports programmes can be seen as marketing expenditure or investment in the nation brand.
Similar to …rms, countries also try to build up what would be called a "base of loyal customers" in business language. Countries may try to make citizens, tax payers or the tax base immobile. Along this dimension, countries may have even more powerful instruments than …rms. Social security systems and the payment structure for civil servants are, for instance, ways to generate a lock-in for some share of the population. Countries also choose or strongly in ‡uence the content of primary and secondary education. They can and do use this to instill patriotism as a particular type of emotional home attachment. Many examples for this type of policy can be given. The prototype of education policy could be observed in Nazi-Germany which very actively pursued an education policy with rather extreme goals. This example also shows that this is a very powerful instrument, and one that is rather unappealing. But more moderate versions of loyalty building education with a clear shift in intentions can be traced in virtually all countries even today. The American Boy Scouts, like many other youth organizations, explicitly 7 Similarly, when politicians travel, they advertize national …rms and their products, but also promote their countries for attracting investors. While such activities are di¢ cult to measure, Rose (2007) , for instance, documents that the foreign service heavily engages in trade policy. mention patriotism as one of their educational goals. 8 Japan just passed a bill according to which patriotism is a declared goal of the compulsory educational system and similar developments emerged recently in Poland where 'patriotism'was discussed as a possible subject to be learned at school.
In what follows I consider e¤ort of this third type: investment in the loyalty of citizens and tax payers. 9 I leave it open what instruments are used when pursuing these goals, but assume that the application of these means is costly. I will …rst allow for countries using both modes of competition: investments in loyalty of citizens, followed by price competition in terms of setting tax rates. I will then restrict tax competition by way of a minimum tax and by tax harmonization.
The option to use instruments that increase tax payers'loyalty may explain why a general downward trend in tax rates has only partially been observed. 10 The low pressure on tax rates may have a partial explanation in such activities that moderate what would otherwise be a cut-throat competition.
Loyalty investment, advertising and nation branding has not been the subject of tax-competition theory, but the analysis of competition for tax base or mobile capital as a common pool problem has a number of precursors who focused on public expenditure on public goods or infrastructure as the means of non-price competition. Taylor (1992) considers jurisdictions which compete for foreign direct investment in a race regarding their speed of infrastructure investment. Menezes (2003) , applying auction theory to this type of …scal competition considers several variants of auctions, including 8 Their o¢ cial aims are stated in their federal charta of June 15, 1916 : "...to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use by Boy Scouts." 9 The role of home attachment has received attention in the literature on decentralized decision making in federations (e.g., Mansoorian and Myers 1993) and in the context of tax competition (e.g., Andersson and Konrad 2003, Ogura 2006) . 10 Investors react to taxes. This is well documented by now, starting with early work by Hartman (1984) and surveyed and evaluated in a meta-study by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) . However, the literature seemingly fails to come up with unanimous evidence on a general downward trend of the …scal burden (see, e.g., Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm 2002). Stewart and Webb 2006, p. 191 ) draw an even more striking conclusion: "Corporations are undoubtedly sensitive to taxation, just as homeowners are sensitive to property taxes. Yet this sensitivity does not give rise to a race to the bottom in corporate taxation any more than it does to property taxes. The fact that Altshuler and Goodspeed …nd no evidence of any intensi…cation of strategic interaction in capital taxation policies during the post 1980 globalization era is entirely consistent with our results." an all-pay auction that involves public investment expenditure at multiple locations and causes wasteful duplication of public infrastructure. Jayet and Paty (2006) consider a similar problem when jurisdictions decide whether or not to build up the infrastructure for a business area, hoping to win or attract lumpy investment. The same type of overinvestment problem is less immediately obvious in a framework with smooth capital ‡ows as in Keen and Marchand (1997) . They also …nd that public expenditure on infrastructure inputs may be excessive, in particular, compared to their alternative use for public consumption goods.
11 Also Sinn's (1997) critical assessment of the functioning of systems competition, particularly the provision of public infrastructure goods in the context of tax competition hints at this problem. These approaches essentially consider the problem of attracting desirable investment as a rent-seeking, or contest problem. Excessive infrastructure expenditure may occur due to several reasons. First, regions or countries may invest and sometimes fail to attract investment, due to the lumpiness of investment projects. Second, even if the allocation of desirable investment is a smooth function of public infrastructure investment, competition directs too much resources into infrastructure competition, compared to its alternative use.
Structurally the analysis uses results from Bertrand competition with shares of loyal 'customers', as in Narasimhan (1988) and Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee (1992), but endogenizes the choice of the set of 'loyal customers', with governments competing for tax revenues from their citizens taking the roles of …rms competing for sales revenues from their customers. 12 A paper that considers formally the endogeneity of the sets of loyal customers is Roy (2000) . He considers …rms'decisions to advertise their existence to di¤erent sets of potential customers. If a customer knows one …rm only, he buys from 11 Several researchers took up this type of competition. Bucovetsky (2005) considers infrastructure investment in a context with agglomeration. Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja and Trannoy (2007) allow for both tax competition and public input competition. Wildasin (1988) and Wilson (2005) consider the role of expenditure competition. Matsumoto (2000) adds labor mobility and Matsumoto (2004) disaggregates public inputs into inputs that are complementary to the mobile factor or to the immobile factor of production in this context. Wehke (2006) analyses how coordination on taxes will a¤ect this second channel of competition. 12 Formally the analysis is closely related to the literature that take their departure from Varian's (1980) this …rm for any price lower than his reservation price. If the consumer knows both …rms, this makes him perfectly price sensitive. If he knows none of the …rms, he does not buy at all. Advertising in this framework may generate or destroy loyalty, depending on whether advertising informs a customer who already knows another …rm or not. This type of investment in loyalty has its counterpart in the context of countries'advertising policy as well. It di¤ers, however, from the type of investment I will consider, by which countries may expose their citizens to an activity that may instill a home attachment in a subgroup of the population.
I proceed as follows. In section 2 I adapt Narasimhan's analysis of price competition with loyal customers to the contest of countries'competition. In section 3 I consider endogenous choices regarding the policy to instill home attachment. Sections 4 and 5 consider minimum taxes and harmonized taxes as possible constraints on the tax rates that countries can choose and how they a¤ect the countries'investment in loyalty. Section 6 concludes.
Tax competition with loyal tax payers
Consider two countries, A and B. In each country there is a set of initial residents, described by an interval of length 1. They can be …rms, …rm owners who may move with their …rms, or individuals with human capital, and I will refer to them either as "citizens" or "tax payers". The joint set is the "common pool". In stage 1 the governments i 2 fA; Bg choose how large a set n i 2 f0; ng with 0 < n < 1 of their initial residents should be made "loyal", i.e., turned into tax payers with strong home attachment. The cost of these policies are C i (0) = 0 and C i (n) = c i > 0. The set of individuals of size 2 n A n B remains mobile. The governments maximize their tax revenues, net of investment cost. 13 They choose per-head taxes t A and t B from the interval [0; r] with r a …nite, exogenously given maximum tax. This choice constitutes stage 2.
In stage 3 individuals react to the taxes. They choose their country of residence and pay taxes. Loyal citizens are attached to their country. They simply pay the tax that applies in their country. Non-loyal citizens are perfectly and costlessly mobile and locate in the country with lower taxes. If both countries have the same tax, they locate in each country with the same probability. Depending on (n A ; n B ; t A ; t B ), country A's tax revenues are
and analogously for B. Note that (1) implicitly de…nes a tie-breaking rule: the tax base 2 n A n B that is not home-attached has an equal chance to locate in each of the countries. 14 Taking also into consideration the cost of n i , the payo¤s can be stated as
The payo¤s in the taxation subgame are structurally equivalent to the pro…ts in Narasimhan's (1988) price leadership game with loyal customers and simultaneous choices of prices. Note that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategies if maxfn A ; n B g > 0. A proof is by contradiction. 15 Narasimhan shows that this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for given n B n A in mixed strategies that are described by the following cumulative distribution functions:
and with F A (t A ) = 0 for t A < n B r 2 n A and F A (t A ) = 1 for t A r, and
r. Note that F B dominates F A in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Both 14 I make this assumption throughout, in order to avoid optimization problems on open sets. 15 Let n B = n. Suppose (t A ; t B ) is an equilibrium. Then t B > 0, as t B n > 0. Let t A = t B > 0. Then t A is not an optimal reply to t B . For instance, t A = t B for su¢ ciently small positive yields higher tax revenue for A. Let t A = t B + for a given …nite positive . Then t B is not an optimal reply to t A , as t B = t A for su¢ ciently small yields higher tax revenue. Similarly for t B = t A + and player A.
distributions have the same support, but
Moreover, only F B may possibly have a mass point and this mass point is at t B = r.
The payo¤s as functions of the own tax choice that emerge from these mixed strategies can be obtained by inserting them into the payo¤ function (2) as
and
; r] and smaller than this equilibrium payo¤ for tax choices from outside this interval. This shows why these mixed strategies constitute optimal replies to each other and proves that (3) and (4) constitute an equilibrium at stage 2. Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee (1992) provide more intuition on this result. By de…nition, country B has more loyal citizens than country A. The country bene…ts from having more loyal citizens if it attracts and taxes only this group. This advantage turns into a disadvantage in the strategic tax competition game. Each country gains the same additional tax base 2 n A n B by undercutting the other country. Country B has higher cost of undercutting A than vice-versa, as B has the larger set of loyal citizens who pay B's tax in any case. Because of this disadvantage, country B has an equilibrium payo¤ that is equal to rn B . This is the minimum amount of taxes which B can obtain, irrespective of t A , and is called the stand-alone payo¤ of country B. Summarizing, the …nding is Proposition 1 (Narasimhan 1988) Let n A n B . Then the tax competition equilibrium with simultaneous choices of tax rates is characterized by mixed strategies (3) and (4) and payo¤s
Note that the country with more loyal tax payers receives an expected tax revenue that is equal to the revenue from taxing the loyal tax payers only. If both countries have chosen to invest in loyal tax payers, due to the symmetry in the size of these groups, both countries end up with tax revenue T i = nr. If country A has chosen n A = 0, then this country also bene…ts from the group of patriots in country B. This can be seen from (9) as A is increasing in n B .
The equilibrium has interesting comparative static properties. First consider taxation and tax revenue. 
respectively. However, Countries which have a larger group of loyal citizens may charge higher taxes in the equilibrium in expectation. For this outcome the particular reason for citizens' loyalty does not need to be speci…ed. Patriotism and other reasons of emotional attachment to one's home country serve similarly as language barriers or institutionally created barriers to migration such as travel restrictions or closed and strictly guarded borders. A key assumption for this result is, of course, that the government aims at high tax revenue. But this is an assumption which is justi…ed both for countries with policy failure and a Leviathan government and for welfarist countries in which the tax proceeds are used to …nance subsistence for a group of (completely immobile and) very poor citizens, and for which the group of citizens considered here is the target group for raising revenues for redistributional purposes.
Empirically, one should observe, for instance, that countries with closed borders, isolated countries, and countries with an overwhelmingly patriotic population may charge higher taxes. Indeed, as is shown in Kessing and Konrad (2007) , across countries there is a positive and signi…cant relationship between the level of patriotism and the level of income taxation.
A further comparative static problem relates to the size of the group of citizens who can be made immobile, for instance, by instilling patriotism or by other means. Globalization may be seen as a process that either increases the cost of turning citizens into loyal citizens, or as a process that reduces the set of people who could be made loyal. The cost e¤ect will be considered later. The e¤ect that makes the set of potentially loyal citizens smaller is as follows:
Proposition 3 An increase in n increases the equilibrium tax revenues for all situations with maxfn A ; n B g = n.
Proof. Consider the payo¤s in (9) for the case with n A = n B = n. In this case ET A = ET B = nr, and this is increasing in n. For n A = 0 and n B = n, we have ET A = 2 n 2 nr, and
Instilling loyalty
Firms build up brands, make customers acquainted to these brands by means of advertising and other marketing means, including the attempt to build up customer relationships with the in ‡ux of new customers. Nations seemingly pursue similar strategies. They advertise the characteristics of their countries in newspapers, use other channels for building up relationships with investors or with citizens with much human capital, and may use their in ‡uence on primary and secondary education to instill home attachment. This shows that loyalty n i as de…ned in section 2 is endogenous. Roy (2000) considered marketing investment by which …rms can invest resources to make …rms' product price known to subsets of a given set of customers. "Being known" in his context means that these customers will hear about this …rm's product price, once this is chosen later on. This type of competition may also apply for tax competition. However, I will focus here on marketing and advertising that is used to build up brand value and reputation towards their own citizens and capital owners and make their own citizens "loyal". I restrict this choice of n i to n i 2 f0; ng. A country either invests in loyal citizens, or it does not.
Consider the payo¤s from the di¤erent combinations of actions as in the matrix below.
nr; nr] then it is optimal for country i to invest (not invest) in loyalty if the other country does not invest (invests) in loyalty.
Proof. Consider country i. Let q j be the probability that the other country j invests. Then the payo¤ of country i is equal to (1 q j ) 0 + q j ( The characterization of optimal replies can be used to describe the investment equilibria for di¤erent ranges of investment cost as in the nine areas in Figure 1 . At very low and very high values of c A and c B both countries have dominant strategies. These are the areas in the corners (Northwest, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest) in the matrix in Figure 1 . For instance, if both countries have a very small cost of loyalty investment, they both invest, such that n A = n B = n. If only one of the countries has a dominant strategy, this strategy choice induces a choice for the other country. The respective Figure 1 . For this mixed strategy equilibrium the values of q A and q B are both increasing in n. If the technology of making citizens loyal becomes more e¤ective in terms of the same amount of cost making a larger share of the own population loyal, then such an investment becomes more valuable for the country:
Both the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive for n 2 (0; 1) for c i 2 ( n 2 nr; nr). In order to counterbalance the increased incentive to invest and to make a country B just indi¤erent between investing and not investing, it is required that A increases its probability of also investing in loyal customers, because this reduces the expected bene…t for B from investing. 16 Intuitively, investment in citizen loyalty is costly, and its bene…cial e¤ect for tax revenues depends on the investment choice of the other country. If both countries do not invest in citizen loyalty, then the tax competition that emerges is very strong and the tax revenue that remains in the equilibrium is zero. Hence, if one country does not invest, the bene…t of investing in citizen loyalty is high for the other country, and even the country that does not invest bene…ts from this investment: the investment makes the countries asymmetric and causes a strategic disadvantage for the country that invested in stage 1. There is a wide range of parameters in which a country would like to free ride on the loyalty investment made by the other country, and this yields the mixed strategy equilibrium as regards investment in loyalty in stage 1 in which both countries are just indi¤erent between investing or not, because the respective other country invests with a probability that generates this indi¤erence. If the cost of investment becomes very small, then both countries may prefer to invest. The tax equilibrium in stage 2 is always in mixed strategies. The country that invested in citizen loyalty has a higher expected tax revenue in the equilibrium, and if this di¤erence outweighs the investment cost, both countries prefer the outcome in which they invest in stage 1. In this outcome both countries compete for the mobile tax base in a mixed strategy equilibrium in stage 2, but they receive an expected tax revenue that is equal to the stand-alone tax revenue nr. Finally, if the cost of making citizens loyal in stage 1 is higher than what can be gained in terms of tax revenue in stage 2, then both countries abstain from such activities.
The characterization of equilibria also reveals that loyalty investment becomes generally more useful if the set of citizens who can be made loyal by this investment is larger. If some new technology or means of non-price competition a¤ects the size of n positively, this increases the probability for such investment to take place, and also increases the expected tax revenue in the equilibrium. Globalization may a¤ect size of n negatively. This will reduce the probabilities of investment in the mixed strategy equilibrium, and also reduces the range in which investing is a dominant strategy for countries.
The cost of rent-seeking e¤ort is equal to c A + c B in the equilibrium in which the choice of such e¤ort becomes a dominant strategy, i.e., for c i < 0; n 2 nr for i = A; B. In the coordination equilibrium for c i 2 n 2 nr; nr , the cost of e¤ort is simply c A or c B , depending on which of the two equilibria is chosen, and in the mixed strategy equilibrium for this parameter range the expected cost of such e¤ort is
This expected e¤ort is increasing in n and in r. This suggests that globalization, interpreted as a decrease in the e¤ectiveness of investment in loyalty, will generally reduce the e¤ort which is invested in such activities. If such efforts are seen as e¤orts for attracting a larger share in a global common, then this aspect is a bene…cial aspect of globalization. However, as a consequence of this reduction in rent-seeking, the tax revenue in the tax competition stage will also fall in expectation, in line with the standard view on globalization and tax competition.
A minimum tax
Suppose now that countries cannot choose taxes t i < t min for some exogenous t min . 17 If countries anticipate that the tax competition in stage 2 is constrained from below by a minimum tax, this will change the tax competition outcome and also has implications for the choice of the countries' rent-seeking e¤orts in their investment in loyalty. Proposition 5 considers cases of su¢ ciently large minimum taxes.
Proposition 5 Let n B = n A = 0. Any minimum tax t min > 0 yields an equilibrium with t A = t B = t min . Let n A = n B = n. A minimum tax with t min 2 [nr; r] yields an equilibrium in pure strategies with t A = t B = t min . Let minfn A ; n B g = 0 and maxfn A ; n B g = n. Then a minimum tax with t min 2 [ 2rn n+2
; r] yields an equilibrium with t A = t B = t min .
Proof. Consider n A = n B = 0. Let A choose t A = t min > 0. For all t B > t A , B will not attract any tax base, and the corresponding tax revenue is zero. Accordingly, the optimal reply to t A = t min is t B (t min ) = t min , as this yields a tax revenue equal to t min 2 2 = t min > 0 for t min > 0. Consider next n A = n B = n. Let A choose t A = t min nr. For all t B > t A the country B receives tax revenue t B n, which is maximal for t B = r. Accordingly, the optimal reply to t A = t min is either t B = t min with tax revenue equal to t min [n+ ] or t B = r with tax revenue equal to rn. As the tax revenue t min 1 nr, the optimal reply is t B (t min ) = t min . For symmetry, the same condition applies for t A to be an optimal reply to t B = t min .
Consider …nally n A = 0 and n B = n. Country B's optimal reply to
; r] is either t B = r, yielding tax revenue equal to rn, or t B = t min , which yields tax revenue equal to t min (n + 2 n 2
). For t min to be optimal requires t min (n + 2 n 2 ) rn, which is equivalent with t min 2rn n+2
. In turn, country A 's optimal reply to t B = t min is either t min , which yields tax revenue t min [
], or t A = r which yields tax revenue of zero. Accordingly, for A the choice of t A = t min > 0 dominates any t A > t B due to n A = 0. (The same argument holds if the roles of A and B are reversed.) Proposition 5 characterizes a minimum tax that is so high that the tax revenue that each country has if both charge the minimum tax is higher than what a country can obtain from deviating and choosing any other tax rate higher than this minimum tax. Such a deviation will leave this country with a tax revenue t i n i , as the other country receives the tax revenue from its loyal citizens, plus the tax revenue from all mobile citizens. This tax revenue from deviating is therefore maximal if the country i chooses the highest possible tax rate, r. The conditions regarding the minimum tax that are stated in Proposition 5 make this tax revenue (weakly) smaller than the tax revenue if the countries both charge the minimum tax.
Note that the imposition of a minimum tax may cause the countries to choose a tax that is lower than the tax they might have chosen otherwise, and the imposition of a minimum tax may cause the expected tax that is charged to reduce. To see this, consider the case with n A = n B = n. In this case, without a minimum tax the average tax is
with F 0 (t) calculated from (3) for n A = n B = n. This average tax rate without a minimum tax is higher than the equilibrium tax with a minimum tax equal to t min = nr if
which is equivalent with 2 n n > exp(2 2n) and holds for n 2 (0; 1). The coordinated minimum tax (and even a high one) can drive down the average tax rate. Note that this does not imply that the minimum tax also drives down the average tax revenue, as the mobile tax base always moves to the low-tax country. Hence, the average tax burden on tax base is lower in the equilibrium with the unconstrained tax rate than the average tax rate.
Turning next to the implications of a su¢ ciently high minimum tax for the choices of n A and n B , the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 If the minimum tax is t min nr then a subgame perfect equilibrium exists with country i choosing
Proof. Both countries anticipate that t A = t B = t min . Accordingly, the payo¤ of country A is t min 2 n B 2
if n A = 0, and equal to t min 2 n A n B 2 +t min n A c A if n A = n, and similarly for B. The optimality of n i as characterized in the proposition follows from comparing these payo¤s.
Note that nr 2rn n+2
. The minimum tax t min nr is, therefore, su¢ ciently high such that the equilibrium tax is t min for all combinations of loyalty investment in stage 1. Indeed, as this is not true for the t min 2 [ 2rn n+2
; nr] this parameter range is more cumbersome and not treated formally here.
Intuitively, if the minimum tax rate is su¢ ciently high, both countries choose a tax rate equal to this minimum tax rate in the stage-2 equilibrium. As they can charge this tax rate on all their loyal citizens, but have to share the mobile citizens with the other country, the investment in loyalty of a set of n citizens is worthwhile if the cost of this investment is lower than the additional tax revenue that results from this investment, which is equal to t min n=2. A su¢ ciently high minimum tax turns the problem in a pure common pool problem: the common pool is shared equally between the competitors, unless they expend e¤ort trying to appropriate a larger share of the common pool for themselves. This is what is accomplished by the investment in loyalty.
Cases with a lower minimum tax rate yield a more colorful picture. The way the taxation equilibrium is a¤ected by the minimum tax depends on the choices (n A ; n B ). Three cases need to be distinguished.
Case 1: n A = n B = 0. In this case any positive minimum tax leads to a tax equilibrium with t A = t B = t min rn and tax revenues T A (t min ) = T B (t min ) = t min .
Case 2: n A = n B = n. If t min nr=(2 n), then the equilibrium tax strategies as in Section 2 are still feasible and mutually optimal replies. Hence, the tax equilibrium is una¤ected. If t min 2 ( nr 2 n ; rn), then the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with the cdfs of tax rates that are characterized by Figure 2 being optimal replies to each other. This mutual optimality can be checked as follows. First we observe that, given F B as in Figure 2 , the expected tax revenue of country A is equal to nr for all t A 2 ft min g [ [t 0 ; r] by inserting in the payo¤ functions, taking into consideration that t 0 = nrt min nt min 2t min +2nr . Intuitively, A's payo¤ along the interval t A 2 (t 0 ; r) is the same as in the absence of a minimum tax. However, once the tax rate which A may choose drops further and comes su¢ ciently close to the minimum tax, the minimum tax becomes more attractive than this tax: unlike without this minimum tax, A cannot be undercut at the minimum tax. Both players have a mass point at the minimum tax. In turn, this implies that, if they both choose the minimum tax, they have to share the mobile tax base equally. If A increases t A just slightly above t min , this increases A's tax revenue on n A = n, but A loses the tax revenue on 2 2n 2 F B (t min ) as all the mobile tax base stays with B with probability F B (t min ). Hence, small increases in t A compared to t A = t min are inferior. Only if A chooses a su¢ ciently high tax rate, the gain on the loyal tax payers compensates for this expected loss in the mobile tax base. The tax rate t 0 and the mass point it generates at t min just balance in the sense that the payo¤ from choosing t 0 (or any other t A 2 (t 0 ; r)) is equal to the payo¤ from choosing t min .
By symmetry, the same reasoning applies for B. Third, note that any feasible choices of t A or t B from (t min ; t 0 ) outside the equilibriums support, yield lower tax revenue.
The expected tax revenue of each country in this equilibrium is T A = T B = nr, and the size of the mass point at t min is obtained from inserting t 0 into the cdf:
Figure 2: The equilibrium cdfs for n A = n B = n and t min 2 ( nr 2 n ; rn) for numerical values n = :5, r = 1 and t min = :4.
Case 3: n A = 0, n B = n. (Note that there is also an antisymmetric Case 4 which is obtained from Case 3 by A and B changing roles). If t min nr=2, then the equilibrium tax strategies as in Section 2 are still feasible and mutually optimal replies. Hence, the tax equilibrium is una¤ected. If t min 2 (
), then the equilibrium is in mixed strategies in tax rate choices, with the cdfs that are characterized in Figure 3 , with t 0 = nrt min 2(nr t min )
. These cdfs coincide with the equilibrium mixed strategies in the case without a minimum tax in the range t i 2 (t 0 ; r). However, both players have a mass point at the minimum tax and do not choose taxes in the range (t min ; t 0 ). The mutual optimality of these strategies can be con…rmed as follows: …rst, it can be veri…ed by inserting into the equation that determines A's expected tax revenue for given F B (t); that the expected tax revenue for country A is equal to nr 2 (2 n) for any choice t A 2 ft min g [ [t 0 ; r], and strictly lower for any feasible t A from outside this set. Second, it can be veri…ed by inserting into the equation that determines B's expected tax revenue for given F A (t), that the expected tax revenue for B is equal to nr for any choice t B 2 ft min g [ [t 0 ; r], and strictly lower for any feasible t B from outside this set. ) for numerical values n = :5, r = 1 and t min = :4.
The mixed strategy equilibrium that emerges for the intermediate range of minimum taxes is structurally similar to the mixed strategy equilibrium that emerges in all-pay auctions if players face an upper limit on their individual bidding e¤orts. The latter problem has been studied by Che and Gale (1998) . This equilibrium is generically unique, but for some particular combinations of parameters further equilibria can emerge.
Consider now the choice of investment in citizens' loyalty in stage 1. Recall that 2rn n+2 nr. Accordingly, for the range t min < 2rn n+2 the following equilibrium payo¤s emerge from the di¤erent investment choices according to the three cases that have been outlined:
The equilibrium choices of investment can be inferred from this matrix along similar lines as in the case without a minimum tax. The optimal investment reply of country i anticipating equilibrium play in stage 2 depends on q j ; t min and c i :
and any q i 2 [0; 1] is optimal if q j 2 n 2 nr + (1 q j )t min = nr c i . This leads to the following Proposition 7 (i) The introduction of a minimum tax t min < 2rn n+2 increases the range of investment cost for which n i = 0 is a dominant strategy. (ii) The minimum tax decreases the range of a country's cost in which n i = n is a dominant strategy. (iii) The minimum tax does not a¤ect country i's equilibrium payo¤ if q i > 0 in the equilibrium.
Proof. (i): By (13) the choice n i = 0 is a dominant strategy for i if c i > nr q j 2 n 2 nr + (1 q j )t min for all q j 2 [0; 1]. The right-hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing in t min for any given q j < 1 and constant in t min for q j = 1. (ii): By (13) the choice n i = 1 is a dominant strategy for i if c i < nr q j 2 n 2 nr + (1 q j )t min for all q j 2 [0; 1]. The right-hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing for all q j < 1 and constant in t min for q j = 1. (iii) If q i > 0, then n i = n is an optimal investment choice and leads to a payo¤ equal to nr c i , which is independent of t min .
A minimum tax increases the payo¤s of the two countries in case they both do not invest, but does not a¤ect the payo¤s if at least one of the countries invests. The immediate e¤ect of this is that investment in loyalty of citizens becomes less rewarding. A low minimum tax may therefore have no impact on the actual tax competition in case at least one country invested in loyal citizens, but it may reduce the incentives to invest in loyalty. For some range of parameters, a small coordinated minimum tax can therefore reduce the e¤orts that countries expend in establishing property rights in their citizens or tax payers.
A harmonized tax
Tax harmonization is among the proposals considered by policy makers in the context of tax competition. Some degree of harmonization has been reached, for instance, within the European Union, with respect to import duties. Harmonization is also discussed frequently in the context of corporate taxation. For instance, the Ruding committee (CEC 1992) has made explicit recommendations in this respect. The bene…ts and costs of tax harmonization have also stimulated considerable interest in the academic literature on tax competition. It has been noticed that harmonization of taxes is often partial in the sense that, while it blocks tax competition with respect to some tax instruments, there remains a su¢ cient number of other instruments that allow for tax competition to continue. 18 The analysis here follows a similar line of argument. Tax harmonization will not remove or block the non-price competition instruments available to countries.
The case with perfect tax harmonization turns the competition problem between countries into a pure common-pool problem. The countries will try to acquire a high share in the tax base and then tax it according to the rate they have agreed upon.
Consider non-price competition, assuming that the tax rate that is chosen by both countries is uniform and equal to t h . The following proposition describes the equilibrium in stage 1. Proof. For a proof, note that the payo¤s from di¤erent investment strategies are as in the following payo¤ matrix:
Let c A c B . Then the equilibrium is in pure strategies with n A = n B = n if c B c A whether the other player invested or not. Second, if c B < 1 2 t h n < c A , then an equilibrium exists in which only B invests and A prefers not to invest. This can also be seen from the matrix in (14) : B prefers to invest, as the additional pro…t from investing is 1 2 t h n c B > 0, independent of whether A invests or not, and for A the cost of investing exceeds the bene…ts in terms of additional tax returns, independent of whether B invests or not. Hence, this asymmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. Finally, if c A c B > 1 2 t h n, then both players prefer not to invest, independent of the other player's investment decision.
Overall, Proposition 8 shows that there are threshold levels for the harmonized tax rate. If the harmonized tax rate is very low, this low level of the tax removes the incentives to generate home-attachment. If the tax rate is above some level, at least one of the countries starts to invest, and if the tax rate is su¢ ciently high, both countries prefer investment compared to the option not to invest. This structure is equivalent to a most simple version of a rentseeking contest. It is, however, a rent-seeking contest in which investment e¤ort can take only a discrete number of levels, and the contest is initiated only if what can be gained from expending contest e¤ort is su¢ ciently much. The outcome with both countries investing in home attachment of their citizens constitutes the classical symmetric prisoners' dilemma in which both sides expend appropriation e¤ort, without winning anything in addition in the aggregate. Both players expend e¤ort to de…ne "property rights" in part of this tax base, i.e., to protect part of their home tax base from possibly ‡oating out of the country.
Conclusions
In a globalized economy with vanishing physical cost of crossing borders for human capital, …nancial capital and direct investment, the stock of mobile capital can be seen as a global common: all countries would like to graze on this common: they would like to attract a large share of this capital and levy taxes on it or its returns. Unfortunately capital is a shy species, and has a tendency to ‡ee from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. This relationship has studied intensively in the context of the tax competition literature.
The common resource property aspect of the global tax base becomes visible from observing that competition for capital is not only …scal com-petition. Countries use other activities to generate a favorable bias that relaxes Bertrand competition. The activities include informative or persuasive advertising, political persuasion and in ‡uence, and e¤ort that increases the value of the brand name of a country and enables policies that make investors or citizens loyal to this brand. These include educational e¤ort that generates home attachment or even patriotism among the own population. This rent-seeking competition closely resembles the competition for a common pool resource in which players expend e¤ort trying to acquire property rights in, or a share of, a common pool resource.
Bertrand competition in tax rates interacts with the appropriation con‡ict in which countries …ght about property rights in the tax base. In the formal part of the paper I assumed that countries can generate loyalty of some group of capital owners by expending appropriate e¤ort. I then considered the outcome of tax competition in a framework in which some or all countries induced loyalty among a subgroup of their citizens. Based on this tax competition outcome I analyze the incentives for such loyalty investment. Countries with low cost of such investment have a higher incentive to invest in the loyalty of their own citizens, but higher loyalty among own citizens is a strategic disadvantage in the tax competition game.
I also consider tax harmonization and tax coordination (a minimum tax) and show that such measures have a tendency to reduce the incentives to engage in appropriation e¤ort.
The welfare implications of this analysis are di¢ cult, given that home attachment often goes along with a change in the preferences of citizens. As far as home attachment is simply a means to increase the mobility cost to a prohibitively high level, the investment in such citizen loyalty is wasteful from a global point of view. However, in a second-best world such investment may be bene…cial as it allows countries to collect higher tax returns from their citizens in the Bertrand equilibrium. Where the erosion of tax revenue endangers the welfare state, these activities can be seen as secondbest reactions of the nation states by which they address the problem of eroding tax revenues.
